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I. Introduction

II. The Pickering/Connick

I. Introduction

Balancing Test
One of the bedrock principles of our
democracy is the right to disagree and
to engage in open and robust debate
about the public issues of the day.
Often, those in power respond by
claiming that too much dissent
undermines our shared purposes.
These same conflicts arise in public
sector employment. Over the past forty
years, federal courts have been called
upon numerous times to weigh the
rights of employees to dissent against
the need of public officials to
implement the programs they were
elected to put in place.
The Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,1
substantially changes the analysis
advocates must use when they
determine litigation strategy. This
article will review the law that led to
Garcetti, the Garcetti decision itself,
and many post-Garcetti decisions. It
will offer some arguments that can
counter Garcetti’s impact.
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A. Pickering v. Board of Education2
Marvin Pickering was discharged
after he wrote a letter to the local
newspaper criticizing the Board of
Education's handling of referendums
that supported new construction and
of the money raised from them. The
letter was sarcastic in tone and
contained a mixture of true and false
factual statements.
The Supreme Court held that the
public statements of public employees
on matters of public concern related to
their employment are protected by the
First Amendment.3 The Court held
that a school teacher could not be
terminated for such statements
unless the employer could demonstrate that the efficiency of the public
service outweighed the employee's
First Amendment rights. Pickering
held that a teacher may publicly
criticize the program of his or her
employer so long as that criticism is
accurate and does not interfere with
his or her day-to-day working
relationships.4 The Court also held
that the First Amendment protects
false statements concerning the
employer if they were not made with
reckless disregard for the truth.
Finally, the Court emphasized that a
teacher is the person in the
Continued on page 2

1

In Garcetti v. Ceballos,1 the U.S.
Supreme Court redefined in some
respects the contours of First Amendment protection for public employees
who express themselves on matters of
public concern. For some time, the
rule as laid down in Pickering v. Board
of Education,2 and Connick v. Myers,3
has involved an essentially two-step
analysis: did the employee's expression touch on a matter of public
concern and, if so, did it nevertheless
so interfere with the employer's
operations as to, on balance, lose its
constitutionally-protected status?
Garcetti adds an element to the
two-step analysis. Garcetti involved a
deputy district attorney (Ceballos) in
Los Angeles County, California, whose
job as "calendar deputy" required him,
among other things, to advise the
District Attorney (Garcetti) on whether
to proceed with certain criminal
prosecutions. In one case, Ceballos
discovered what he believed were
serious misrepresentations by a
sheriff's police officer in an affidavit
that had been used to obtain a search
warrant which in turn produced
critical prosecution evidence. Ceballos
told his superiors of his findings,
including in an official memorandum
recommending that the prosecution be
dismissed. That led to a heated
meeting with sheriff's personnel, after
Continued on page 5
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community "most likely" to have an
informed and definite opinion regarding the employer's fiscal program.
B. Connick v. Myers5
Pickering protected speech on
matters of public interest. Because
public employers are funded by tax
dollars, under a broad definition of
"matters of public interest," it could be
argued that the First Amendment
protects speech by employees that
those dollars have been misspent, or
that employees have been treated
unfairly in ways that damage their
ability to serve the public. This logic
would require First Amendment
protection for much speech by public
employees regarding the operations of
their workplaces.
In Connick v. Meyers, the Supreme Court took a much narrower
view of the speech protected by
Pickering. Myers was discharged for
circulating a questionnaire to her
colleagues in the District Attorney's
office regarding transfer policies, office
Stephen A. Yokich
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morale, the confidence employees had
in their supervisors, the need for a
grievance procedure, and whether
employees felt pressure to work on
political campaigns.
The Court reversed the lower
court decisions, which had overturned
the discharge. The Court's basic
premise was that the questionnaire
concerned matters of private concern
regarding Myers' own employment,
not matters of general public concern.
"When employee expression cannot be
fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide
latitude in managing their offices,
without intrusive oversight by the
judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment."6 Rejecting the premise
that "all matters which transpire in a
public office are matters of public
concern," the Court held that the
contents of Myers' questionnaire were
aimed at gathering information for
another round of controversy with her
superiors and not at matters of public
concern.7
The Court did hold that the portion
of the questionnaire regarding pressure to work on political campaigns
was a matter of public concern. Giving
deference to the judgment of her
employer, the Court held that the
potential for the questionnaire to
disrupt the efficient functioning of the
office outweighed the matters of public
concern contained in the questionnaire. "The limited First Amendment
interest involved here does not require
that Connick tolerate action which he
reasonably believed would disrupt the
office, undermine his authority, and
destroy close working relationships."8
Accordingly, the Court concluded that
the discharge did not violate the First
Amendment.

III. Garcetti v. Ceballos9
Ceballos was a deputy district

2

attorney in Los Angeles. He investigated the factual accuracy of a search
warrant and became convinced that
the warrant contained serious misrepresentations. He raised his concerns
with his superiors and with the
sheriff's department. Afterwards, he
was transferred and denied a promotion. He sued, alleging that his
superiors had retaliated against him,
in violation of the First Amendment
for raising questions about the
warrant.
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme
Court held Ceballos' speech was not
protected by the First Amendment
because it was made pursuant to his
duties as a deputy district attorney.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, summarized the holding:
When an employee speaks as a
citizen addressing a matter of
public concern, the First Amendment requires a delicate balancing
of the competing interests surrounding the speech and its
circumstances. When, however,
the employee is simply performing
his or her job duties, there is no
warrant for a similar degree of
scrutiny. To hold otherwise would
be to demand permanent judicial
intervention in the conduct of
governmental operations to a
degree inconsistent with sound
principles of federalism and the
separation of powers.10
Under Garcetti, a public employee
who has suffered retaliation due to his
expressive conduct on the job must
now pass a new threshold: was the
expression pursuant to his or her
official job duties? If so, the court need
never reach the issue of whether the
speech was on a matter of public
concern. If not, the court should
employ the Pickering/Connick balancing test to determine whether the
expression in question was protected
by the First Amendment.11
The majority opinion in Garcetti
specifically cited the portions of

IPER REPORT
Pickering that emphasized the constructive role that public employees
have in the vibrant dialogue necessary
for the proper functioning of a
democratic society.12 It also reaffirmed
that the First Amendment protects
speech made at work and speech that
concerns the subject matter of an
employee's employment.13 The Court
eschewed a "comprehensive framework" for defining the scope of an
employee's duties and cautioned
employers that merely writing an
expansive job description would not
serve to bar legitimate First Amendment activities.14 Finally, the Court
stopped short analyzing the impact of
its reasoning with respect to the
constitutional cases on academic
scholarship or teaching.15

IV. Garcetti’s Impact
The ruling in Garcetti is at odds with
one Pickering insight, that teachers
are "the members of a community
most likely to have informed and
definite opinions"16 about school
funding and spending. Since nobody
knows a job better than the person in
it, it would seem that an employee
speaking about issues connected with
or arising from his or her official duties
would have more to contribute to the
interests served by open debate about
decisions, not less. The Court's decision in Garcetti accords no weight to
this insight.
Garcetti has made it riskier for
public employees to challenge the
orthodoxy of their employers. While
Garcetti made it clear that the
"pursuant to official duties" test was a
threshold issue, several courts have
cited Garcetti when weighing the
employer's interests under the
Pickering/Connick balancing analysis.17 In addition, the Court's holding
in Garcetti has made it much riskier
for employees to challenge their
employer when they discover fraud,
discrimination, or abuses in their
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employer's policies.18
In Casey v. West Las Vegas
Independent School District,19 for
example, the court held unprotected a
superintendent who directed her
subordinate to report violations of
federal Head Start regulations to the
federal government. The Board had
told her to let the matter alone. She
acted in part because of the potential
criminal and civil liability involved. It
is difficult to imagine why we should
discourage such speech. It is equally
difficult to imagine why an employee
should have to choose between her job
and complying with the law in such a
situation. Similarly, the plaintiffs in
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown,20 and
Wilburn v. Robinson,21 alleged that
they suffered retaliation for enforcing
the anti-discrimination policies at
their employers. The Courts have
always given heightened protection to
speech opposed to discrimination. For
example, in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District,22 the
Court held that the First Amendment
protects the right of a teacher to
privately complain to her superiors
about racial discrimination in the
schools. Why should it make a
difference that a teacher raised the
issue instead of the Director of
Personnel?
Garcetti has also made it riskier
for public employees to honestly carry
out their job duties when such action
might bring them into conflict with
their superiors. Consider the case of
Spiegla v. Hull.23 Spiegla was a prison
guard who saw two superiors engage
in activity that ordinarily would have
made them subject to a search. She
was told not to perform the search, and
when she questioned the order, she
was told that the policy had changed.
After she raised the issue of the policy
change in a staff meeting, she was
reassigned to a more difficult job. The
Seventh Circuit originally held that
Spiegla's statements were related to a
matter of public concern because of the

3

intense security needs of the correctional environment and because she
directly observed her superiors acting
in a way that required a search under
the applicable regulations.24 Spiegla
prevailed at trial.
In a second appeal, after Garcetii,
the Seventh Circuit reversed the
verdict. The court noted that one part
of Spiegla's job was to properly
implement the search policy at the
prison.25 It held that Spiegla had
spoken as an employee pursuant to her
official duties and not as a citizen on a
matter of public concern.26 Other
courts have similarly denied First
Amendment protection to employees
who questioned the soundness of the
judgments of their superiors with
respect to issues closely connected to
their jobs.27
Courts have limited the holding in
Garcetti by distinguishing between
internal statements and public statements. Thus, courts have rejected the
application of Garcetti to cases
involving public letters,28 the publication of books,29 and potential speeches
at public events.30 They have also
rejected the application of Garcetti in
cases involving communications with
other state agencies, such as the Office
of the Attorney General31 and a State's
Inspector General.32 Finally, courts
have rejected the application of
Garcetti to communications with
state or local legislators.33
One notable aspect of these
decisions has been the willingness of
courts to make distinctions depending
upon the "hearer" of the speech. In
Casey, for example, the school
superintendent told her board of
education that it was violating the
New Mexico open meetings law. She
also sought advice from the Attorney
General on her position. The court held
that the speech to the school board was
not protected under Garcetti, but that
the speech directed to the Attorney
General was subject to the Pickering/
Connick balancing test.34 Similarly, a
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correction officer, in Freitag v. Ayers,35
complained both internally and to her
state legislator and the Inspector
General of the state about the prison's
failure to take action to control the
public sexual activities of inmates.
The court held that the internal
complaints were related to her duties
as a correctional officer, but that the
communications with the legislator
and the Inspector General were
protected.36
There is a great irony in the
foregoing point. It makes the forum of
the speech much more important than
the content of the speech for First
Amendment protection. An "off-thewall" letter to the newspaper
(Pickering) is protected, while a
prosecutor's effort to vindicate the
public trust reposed in his position is
not (Garcetti). In many cases, however, it is the content of the speech, not
the form of the expression, that
determines the value of expressive
conduct. It would be unfortunate if the
Court's decision in Garcetti leads to
the opposite result.

V. Approaches for Employee
Advocates
What follows are practical considerations for employee advocates who are
fortunate enough to be consulted prior
to the speech or expression that might
lead to retaliation. Advocates should
judge whether use of these ideas is
appropriate, depending on what
political and employment situation is
involved.
A. Go Big or Stay Home
It follows from the decisions in
Freitag and Casey that an employee
who fears retaliation for criticizing a
superior or the direction of the
employer's policies should openly seek
the assistance of the general public
and other public bodies. If you think
the going is going to be rough, write
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the newspaper or your state representative. Then you can base your
retaliation argument on the speech
that was made to external agencies.37
B. Act As a Group
The Supreme Court has held that
freedom of speech and association
protect a public employee's right to
join a union without employer
retaliation. This right logically extends to the right to participate in
union activities, such as processing
grievances. By definition, though,
almost all grievance processing
involves internal employment issues
and speech about those issues. While
it could be argued under Garcetti that
such activities are unprotected,
because they relate to the official
duties of the employees involved, the
courts have thus far held that the
union activities of employees are not
affected by the decision.38
Lawyers for employees should
disentangle the rights of freedom of
association and freedom of speech. The
right to form, join and participate in a
union derives from the freedom of
association guaranteed by the First
Amendment. This freedom to engage
in collective activity is at risk if one
can be punished for it. Thus, employee
lawyers must stress this basis for the
constitutional rights at issue to skirt
the analysis of Garcetti. Lawyers for
employees represented by unions
should also urge employees to let their
unions carry the ball in disagreements
that may lead to adverse action. This
will lessen the chance that an
employer can sustain retaliation based
upon the principles in Garcetti.
C. Emphasize Due Process
The Court stressed in Garcetti
that a public employer may not rely on
a written job description to conclusively determine whether particular
speech was part of an employee's

4

official duties. Instead, the court
must look to all of the evidence
regarding the nature of an employee's
official duties.
It would violate principles of due
process for an employer to expand
the scope of an employee's job
without telling the employee and
then to discipline that employee for
speaking in a way that was
previously approved. While no court
has yet considered such a fact
pattern, that is only because
Garcetti has largely been applied in
cases where the factual development is already complete.

VI. Conclusion
Garcetti narrowed the constitutional protection accorded to many
types of valuable expression. The
decision makes it riskier for public
employees to challenge their employers over many of the issues they
know best. It undercuts some of the
basic principles set forth in the
Pickering case. Does Garcetti
portend a fundamental retreat from
the broad First Amendment rights
enjoyed by public employees since
Pickering? Or is it an aberration?
X
Only time will tell.
________________________
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which Garcetti decided to proceed with
the prosecution anyway. During the
prosecution, at a hearing on a defense
motion to quash evidence from the
search warrant, Ceballos testified
about his belief that there were
significant misrepresentations in the
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affidavit underlying the warrant.
Thereafter, Ceballos allegedly was
reassigned to other duties, transferred
to another location, and ultimately
denied a promotion.
The Supreme Court majority
assumed that Ceballos' memorandum
to his superiors addressed a matter of
public concern, namely, governmental
misconduct in a law enforcement
matter. But the majority held the
memorandum unprotected because it
was written as part of Ceballos'
regular job responsibilities. The
Garcetti majority reasoned:
We hold that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.
This result is consistent with our
precedents' attention to the potential societal value of employee
speech. Refusing to recognize
First Amendment claims based on
government employees' work product does not prevent them from
participating in public debate . . .
Our holding likewise is supported
by the emphasis of our precedents
on affording government employers sufficient discretion to manage
their operations. Employers have
heightened interests in controlling
speech made by an employee in his
or her professional capacity.
Official communications have
official consequences, creating a
need for substantive consistency
and clarity. Supervisors must
ensure that their employees'
official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s
mission4
Thus, under Garcetti, even if a
public employee’s expression involves
a matter of public concern, it remains
unprotected unless it was spoken "as a
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citizen," meaning not in the course of
the employee's regular job requirements.

II. Applying Garcetti’s “Spoken As A Citizen” Requirement
It may sometimes prove difficult to
differentiate when public employees'
expressions on matters of public
concern occurr "pursuant to the
employees' official employment responsibilities," rather than "as a
citizen." In Battle v. Board of
Regents,5 the plaintiff worked in the
financial aid office of Fort Valley State
University in Georgia. According to
the Eleventh Circuit, under both
university policies and federal guidelines, such an employee "had a clear
employment duty . . . to report any
mismanagement or fraud she encountered in student financial aid files."6
From 1996 to 1998, Battle discovered
what she considered extensive evidence of improprieties by her supervisor, including "falsifying information,
awarding financial aid to ineligible
recipients, making excessive awards,
and forging documents."7 On several
occasions, Battle reported those
findings to the University's President
and its Vice President of Student
Affairs. Battle never, however, spoke
to anyone outside the University about
them. In May 1998, Battle was notified
by the Board of Regents that her
employment contract was not being
renewed.8
When Battle sued, the trial court, in
a decision issued before Garcetti,
rendered summary judgment against
her. Applying Garcetti, the Eleventh
Circuit had little difficulty affirming
that judgment, stating:
By Plaintiff's own admission and
in light of federal guidelines,
Plaintiff's speech to FVSO officials
about inaccuracies and signs of
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fraud in student files was made
pursuant to her official employment responsibilities. We conclude that because the First
Amendment protects speech on
matters of public concern made by
a government employee speaking
as a citizen, not as an employee
fulfilling official responsibilities,
Plaintiff's retaliation claim must
fail.9
Battle was followed in Wilburn v.
Robinson.10 Wilburn served as Interim Director of the District of
Columbia's Office of Human Rights.
In June 2002, Wilburn sought to hire
two black female attorneys for her
agency, but the District's Office of
Personnel refused to approve the
salaries she recommended for them,
based on a District policy that Wilburn
felt embodied race and gender
discrimination. Expressing that belief, Wilburn requested reconsideration of her salary recommendations.
Her request was denied, and she was
admonished for making "unsubstantiated allegations." Wilburn then was
passed over for selection as the OHR's
permanent Director and sued alleging
First Amendment retaliation.11
The trial court rendered summary
judgment against Wilburn, finding
that she lacked evidence of a causal
connection between her allegations
about salary discrimination and her
nonselection for the OHR Director
position. The D.C. Circuit affirmed,
but on a more basic, alternative
ground: that Wilburn's complaints
were not made "as a citizen" and
therefore were not constitutionally
protected in the first place.12 Citing
Battle, the D.C. Circuit noted that,
under Garcetti "courts of appeals have
denied First Amendment protection to
government employee speech if the
contested speech falls within the scope
of the employee's uncontested employment responsibilities.”13 The court
then observed:

6

Wilburn's allegations of discrimination in DCOP's refusal to
approve the salaries she requested
easily falls within Wilburn's
employment responsibilities. …
Indeed, Wilburn was hired not
only to direct personnel matters in
OHR but also to root out
discrimination in the District
government and, thus, when
Wilburn commented on racial
discrimination in the performance
of her duties, she did not speak as
a citizen. Accordingly, the First
Amendment does not shield from
discipline the expressions Wilburn
made . . .14
In Green v. Board of Commissioners of Canadian County,15 however,
a drug-lab technician and detention
officer at a county juvenile center
complained to her superiors that the
center was not following reliable drugscreening protocols and, when her
complaint seemed to go unheeded,
took it on herself to secure a
confirmatory test on one client that
revealed the center's initial test as
erroneous. Green's actions apparently
brought about a change in the center's
testing practices, but Green was
reassigned and eventually forced out of
her job.16
When Green filed suit alleging First
Amendment retaliation, her claims
were deemed untenable based on
Garcetti. The Tenth Circuit noted the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Battle,
and two other federal appeals court
decisions17 that had found public
employees' expressions on matters of
public concern to be constitutionally
unprotected because they occurred as
The
part of the employees' jobs.18
Green court reasoned:
On the one hand, the speech and
conduct at issue can be categorized
as activities undertaken in the
course of Ms. Green's job. She had
the responsibility for collecting
samples and testing them, and by
extension, making sure the tests
were as accurate as possible . . .
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She also had the responsibility for
communicating with clients and
with third parties regarding
testing. Under this view, by
making arrangements for the
confirmation test without consulting her supervisors, Ms. Green
decided to ignore her supervisors'
instructions . . . and thereby
properly should be subject to
discipline.
On the other hand, one could argue
that Ms. Green was not a
policymaker and her job responsibilities focused on the logistics of
taking tests and keeping records,
so she was not required to improve
the Center's system by advocating
for a confirmation policy or
obtaining the confirmation test.
Under this view, by arranging for
the confirmation test to underline
the validity of her previously
expressed concerns, Ms. Green . . .
was acting outside her day-to-day
job responsibilities for the public
good . . .
We conclude that this case is more
similar to Garcetti . . . than to
activities undertaken by employees acting as citizens. Ms. Green
was not communicating with
newspapers or her legislators or
performing some similar activity
afforded citizens; rather, even if
not explicitly required as part of
her day-to-day job responsibilities,
her activities stemmed from and
were the type of activities that she
was paid to do . . . Her
disagreement with her supervisors' evaluation of the need for a
formal testing policy, and her
unauthorized obtaining of the
confirmation test to prove her
point, inescapably invoke Garcetti's
admonishment that government
employees’ First Amendment
rights do "not invest them with a
right to perform their jobs however
they see fit."19
The Seventh Circuit similarly has
held that, in deciding for Garcetti
purposes whether an employee has
spoken pursuant to her official duties,
focusing on whether the speech was
part of her “core job funtions” is too
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narrow.20 A contrasting case is Coles
v. Moore.21 There, a social worker for
the Connecticut Department of Children and Families alleged that she was
denied several promotions and job
assignments after she complained to
the Connecticut Commission on
Human Rights about unlawful employment discrimination by her
agency. Although the Coles court
noted that the plaintiff's discrimination allegations were made through
the proper channels and concerned the
subject matter of the plaintiff's
employment, the court also observed
that Coles' official duties did not
include filing such complaints against
her supervisors. Therefore, her complaints were filed "as a citizen" for
Garcetti purposes.22
In Reuland v. Hynes,23 a general
trial attorney in the Brooklyn
prosecutor's office wrote a novel about
a homicide detective, and at the same
time met with the District Attorney to
request promotion to a homicide unit.
Reuland received the promotion and a
month before his novel was to be
published, was interviewed by New
York Magazine for an article on new
authors, in which he touted his book
and was quoted as saying that
"Brooklyn is the best place to be a
homicide prosecutor . . . we've got more
dead bodies per square inch than
anyplace else."24 After the article
appeared, Reuland was transferred
out of the homicide unit and later
terminated. He sued for violation of
his First Amendment rights and won
a jury verdict of $30,000.25
The Second Circuit affirmed
Reuland’s jury verdict. The court
found that Reuland's magazine comment was not made in the exercise of
his official responsibilities.26 Moreover, the court ruled that Reuland's
statement was protected even if he
made it not to criticize local law
enforcement but merely to hype his
novel. The court held that even if
Reuland's comment was "hyperbole" –
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a deliberate exaggeration – it remained protected.27
But, in Tokashiki v. Freitas,28 a
secretary to a county police chief wrote
a letter to the Police Commission
about the chief’s violations of Police
Commission requirements. The Ninth
Circuit found the record insufficient to
determine whether that letter to the
Police Commission was protected, and
remanded the case to the trial court for
further analysis.29
Given Tokashiki’s job, however,
and assuming she bore the customary
responsibility to report to her
employer any knowledge she possessed
of violations of employer policies by
other employees, should it not have
been presumed that her letter to the
Police Commission was "pursuant to
her duties as an employee?"30
In Cioffi v. Averill Park Central
School District,31 a high school athletic director sent a letter to the
superintendent expressing concerns
that the school’s football coach was not
properly supervising the team. Shortly
thereafter, reports of hazing among
the players appeared in the local press.
Then Cioffi heard that the school board
might have decided to abolish his
position. Apparently fearing that he
was being made a scapegoat, Cioffi
held a press conference in which he
alleged that the impending elimination of his job was in retribution for his
criticisms of the coach. Nevertheless,
the board abolished his job as
planned.32
When Cioffi sued, before Garcetti,
the trial court held that only Cioffi's
letter to the superintendent could
support his claim, because the board
had already decided to eliminate his
job by the time of his press conference.
But, the court held that Cioffi's letter
was unprotected because Cioffi wrote
it purely to deflect blame from himself
and save his job, i.e., his motive was
private, not public. The Second Circuit
disagreed and reinstated Cioffi's
claims,33 ruling that Cioffi's selfish
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motivation was irrelevant as long as
the letter touched on a matter of public
concern.34 In light of Garcetti,
however, one must ask whether a
letter from an athletic director to his
superintendent, expressing concerns
with the football coach's job performance, should not be regarded clearly
as within the scope of the athletic
director's official job responsibilities,
and therefore not written "as a
citizen."

III. The Pickering Balance
Test After Garcetti
Having reemphasized the importance
of a governmental employer's interests
in regulating what its employees do
and say while carrying out their
duties, Garcetti also may affect how
courts apply the Pickering/Connick
balance test. Once it has been determined that a public employee spoke "as
a citizen" and on a mater of public
concern, a court must determine
whether the employee's speech nevertheless lacked protection because it
unduly disrupted or interfered with
the employer's operations.
In Communications Workers of
America v. Ector County Hospital
District,35 the en banc Fifth Circuit
held, in the wake of Garcetti, that a
Texas hospital's "interest in promoting the efficiency of the public service
it performs by means of its uniform
non-adornment policy outweigh[ed]
the interest of its [non-patient-care]
employees in wearing a 'Union Yes'
button on their uniforms while on duty
at the Hospital."36 The court presumed
that wearing union buttons at work
constituted speech on a matter of
public concern.37 But the court cited
Garcetti for the proposition that the
government "has far broader powers"
to restrict employee speech than to
regulate the speech of ordinary
citizens, and concluded that, because
the hospital required all its nonpatient care employees to wear
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uniforms, its regulation forbidding
them to supplement or adorn those
uniforms prevailed over the employees' interest in expressing their union
solidarity through union buttons.38
According to the Ector County
Hospital court, giving effect to the
hospital's non-adornment rule in this
context "result[ed] in only a minimal
intrusion on the free speech rights of
union employees," since the employees
could "continue to express their
support for the union in myriad other
ways."39 Importantly, however, the
Fifth Circuit suggested that the
balance might tip differently in a state
which, unlike Texas, permits public
employees to petition for their
employer's recognition of their union.40
Garcetti may also bolster the
authority of public educational employers to regulate what instructional
personnel say while teaching. In
Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College,41 a
public college's cosmetology program
included a clinical segment in a
college-operated beauty salon. Students complained that Piggee, an
instructor in the salon, approached
students she suspected of being
homosexual and attempted to give
them anti-gay religious pamphlets
and lecture them about changing their
sexual orientations. The college
admonished Piggee to stop that
activity, and eventually declined to
renew her teaching contract.42
The Seventh Circuit presumed that
Piggee's expression of her views on
religion and homosexuality touched on
matters of public concern, but
downplayed the significance of that
element in Piggee's case. According to
the court, commentary on matters of
public concern is commonplace in the
college setting, where instructors
regularly cover public topics in their
teaching. Therefore, the court reasoned, the "real question" in such
higher education cases involves the
balance between the instructor's First
Amendment freedom and the college's
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right to require instructors to "stay on
message" while teaching.43 Finding
that the balance tipped in favor of the
college, the Seventh Circuit noted: (1)
although Piggee's speech took place in
a commercial establishment, the salon
was part of the college's clinical
program, and (2) it was evident that
Piggee's speech disrupted the college's
educational program, because students complained about it.44
More recently, in Mayer v. Monroe
County Community School Corp.45 a
public elementary school teacher
alleged she was fired because she
confided to her class, during a currentevents session, that she had honked
her car horn to show her support while
passing a local demonstration in favor
of peace in Iraq. In deciding that
Mayer's statement to her class was not
protected under Garcetti, the Seventh
Circuit explained why in Piggee it
applied the Pickering/Connick balance:
Piggee had not been hired to
buttonhole cosmetology students
in the corridors and hand out
tracts proclaiming that homosexuality is a mortal sin. The speech to
which the student (and the college)
objected was not part of Piggee's
teaching duties. By contrast,
Mayer's current-events lesion was
part of her assigned tasks in the
classroom; Garcetti applies directly.46
Thus, Mayer apparently stands for the
proposition that what an instructor
says in class as part of the curriculum
may not be protected at all after
Garcetti, regardless of whether it
unduly disrupts or interferes with the
school's teaching mission.
On the other hand, in a somewhat
different context, the Fifth Circuit has
eased a plaintiff's burden in First
Amendment litigation. In Oscar Renda
Contracting, Inc. v. City of Lubbock,47
the plaintiff, a construction contractor, alleged that, even though it was
low bidder, it was denied a contract
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with the defendant municipality
because the company previously had
sued a different Texas municipality
alleging improprieties by municipal
officials. The district court dismissed
the contractor's suit, but the Fifth
Circuit reversed and reinstated it.
Without discussing Garcetti, the
Fifth Circuit clarified that, like an
individual employee or job applicant, a
company can claim constitutional
protection against being denied a work
opportunity with a public body in
retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights.48 The Fifth Circuit did
not address whether such a business,
by filing suit over a lost business
opportunity, acts "as a citizen" as
Garcetti requires, although that
seems fairly clear in light of the
authorities discussed above. However,
the court held that, in such a case, the
contractor need not show that it had an
existing or prior contracting relationship with the defendant municipality
to outweigh the municipality's interests and establish a violation of its
constitutional rights when the balance
test is applied.49 According to the
Oscar Renda court, a contractor can
recover for being denied a first
contract, just as a job applicant can
recover for being denied a job, if the
denial was in reprisal for First
Amendment activity.
The Fifth
Circuit indicated that any difference
in analysis that may be warranted
because the plaintiff is a business
entity rather than an individual can be
accommodated within the Pickering
balance test.50

IV. The Practical Implications for Employers
Garcetti re-emphasizes that giving
proper effect to First Amendment
freedoms in the public workplace
requires an appreciation of practical
workplace realities. Those realities
demand that governmental employers
be permitted to deal with routine
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personnel matters without each instance becoming a potential "federal
case." The Supreme Court made this
same general point in O'Connor
v. Ortega,51 where a plurality observed
that, while public employees possess
Fourth Amendment rights against
invasive searches in the employment
context, those rights are "reduced by
virtue of actual office practices and
procedures," and that therefore "the
privacy interests of government
employees in their place of work . . .
are far less than those found at home
or in some other context."52 The
Garcetti majority referred to O'Connor
and invoked similar logic in support of
its conclusion that public employees’
speech in the performance of employment duties does not implicate the
First Amendment.
Even if that represents the correct
interpretation of the "as a citizen"
phraseology from Pickering,53 however, it is questionable whether it
significantly improves the public
employer's ability to cope with the
practical realities of the government
workplace. Before Garcetti, a public
employee could feel relatively safe that
First Amendment protection would at
least potentially be available when the
job required the employee to report
about controversial matters of public
concern. In the wake of Garcetti, the
public employee whose job obliges the
employee to make such reports will
enjoy First Amendment protection
only by publishing the substance of
the official report outside channels,
e.g., to the media or to external
authorities. The suggestion of the
Garcetti majority, that by enacting
internal whistleblower or similar
protections a public employer may
alleviate the employee's incentive to
"go public" in this fashion, is well
taken only insofar as public employees
have confidence in such internal
protections. Where skepticism or
distrust of internal protections prevails, or where employees have
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confidence only in the Constitution and
the federal courts, they may feel
compelled by Garcetti to go public with
their official reports on sensitive public
issues or (just as damagingly) to avoid
reporting on such matters at all. X
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Recent
Developments
Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the two collective
bargaining statutes

IELRA & IPLRA
Developments
Subjects of Bargaining
In Board of Trustees v. ILRB &
IELRB, 224 Ill.2d 88, 862 N.E.2d 944
(2007), the Illinois Supreme Court
decided a consolidated case under the
IELRA and the IPLRA involving
whether a proposal regarding parking
arrangements for employees constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining. In the IELRA case, the University
of Illinois at Urbana unilaterally
increased parking fees paid by
building service and food service
workers and maintained that it was
not required to bargain with the
Service Employees International
Union because parking fees were not
a mandatory subject of bargaining. In
the IPLRA case, the Fraternal Order
of Police Labor Council filed two unfair
labor practice charges against the
University after the University
refused to consider a FOP parking
proposal on behalf of university police
officers.
In both cases, the Administrative
Law Judges determined that the
University violated state labor law by
refusing to bargain over the issue of
parking. The IELRB and ILRB upheld
the ALJs' decisions. However, both
causes were reversed on appeal
because the Appellate Court found that
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the burdens on university managerial
authority outweighed the benefits of
collective bargaining.
The Supreme Court reversed. It
explained that under Central City
Educational Ass'n v. IELRB, 149 Ill.
2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992), the
court undertakes a three part analysis
to determine whether an issue is a
mandatory subject of bargaining.
First, the court determines whether
the issue is one regarding wages,
hours, or terms and conditions of
employment. If the answer is negative,
than the issue is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining. However, if the
issue does involve wages, hours, or
terms and conditions of employment,
the court must consider whether the
issue involves inherent managerial
authority. If the answer to this
question is negative, than the issue is
a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. If, on the other hand, the
answer is affirmative, the court
balances the benefits that bargaining
would have on the decision making
process against the burdens that
bargaining imposes upon the employer's
authority.
The University contended that
parking does not involve wages, hours,
or terms and conditions of employment
because employees are not required to
use the University's parking facilities.
Rejecting the University's argument,
the court noted that the majority of
employees commute to work by car and
that parking services provided by the
University are critical to the working
lives of these employees.
The University argued that because
its parking division is required to be
self-funding, decisions regarding parking are inherently managerial. Additionally, the University argued that
because the issue of parking impacts
student services, it touches upon the
University's essential academic functions and is therefore inherently
managerial. The court rejected the
University's arguments. The court
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determined that the University's core
management authority is implicated
only if the final collective bargaining
agreement does not provide adequate
revenue to sustain the parking
division's financial obligations. The
court noted that although student
parking is an appropriate consideration for the university, it is not
inherently an integral part of the
University's managerial authority.
Thus, the court concluded that
parking was a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.

IELRA Developments
Injunctive Relief
In Laborers' International Union of
North America, Local 773 and Cairo
Unit School District 1, Case No. 2007CA-0020-S (IELRB 2007), the IELRB
granted the union's request for a
preliminary injunction pursuant to
Section 16(d) of the IELRA to prevent
the district from transferring a dayshift maintenance worker to an
evening-shift custodial position.
In early 2005, a maintenance
worker filed two unfair labor practice
charges against the district. During
the 2005-2006 school year, the
maintenance worker had excessive
absences due to illness. The district
therefore desired to transfer the
employee to a custodial position
because, according to the district, if he
were absent, it would be easier to find
a substitute to perform custodial
duties than one to perform maintenance duties. However, the transfer
would force the employee to quit his
second job, where he worked the
evening shift. The district attempted
to transfer the employee, "due to [his]
inordinate absentee rate and [his]
overall uncooperative attitude," and
the union filed an unfair labor practice
charge.
The IELRB granted the union's
request for a preliminary injunction
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because there was a significant
likelihood that the union would prevail
on the merits of its charge. The IELRB
inferred that the district had an
unlawful motivation for transferring
the employee, because the timing was
suspect where it transferred the
employee after he filed two unfair labor
practice charges, and because the
district transferred the employee for
an "uncooperative attitude," often a
euphemism for the employee having
pro-union sentiments. Further, the
transfer would have an adverse effect
on the employee because he would have
to quit his second job. The IELRB also
found that preliminary relief was "just
and proper," because without it, the
employee would have to perform duties
he did not want to perform, which is
not something that could be remedied
X
later.

Further
References
(compiled by Yoo-Seong Song, Librarian,
Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations Library, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign)

revitalization of unions especially in
the public sector. The author predicts
that private sector unions will attempt
aggressively to win membership and
represent public sector employees in
the next several decades.

McEntee,Gerald W. THE NEW CRISIS
OF PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT. PUBLIC PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT. VOL. 35, NO. 4.
WINTER 2006. PP.343-346.
The author claims that AFSCME has
played a major role in promoting public
workers' economic and social status for
the past 70 years. He lists several
areas where AFSCME made significant progress, such as public employee
pension plans and raising salaries, and
assesses that AFSCME's efforts in the
past have been effective. The author,
however, points out that the current
environment is not favorable towards
public employees and public sector
unions. He identifies five areas of
challenge that AFSCME and other
public sector unions face and believes
that the future of public sector unions
relies on how public sector unions
respond to those challenges now. The
five challenges are: fiscal limits,
privatization, civil service reform, pension reform, and collective bargaining.

Riccucci, Norma A. THE CHANGING
FACE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
UNIONISM. REVIEW OF PUBLIC
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.
VOL. 27, NO. 1. MARCH 2007.
PP.71-78.
In this article, the author provides a
current state of public sector unions with
some relevant data. He describes key
reasons for the continuing decline of
unions in the private sector and growth
in the public sector. Overall, the struggle
to survive is still a major theme to both
private and public sector unions, but the
author sees some opportunities for the
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(Books and articles anotated in Further
References are available on interlibary
loan through ILLINET by contacting your
local public library or system headquarters.)
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